California State University, San Bernardino

CSUSB ScholarWorks
Theses Digitization Project

John M. Pfau Library

2000

An evolution perspective of coalition formation within
organizations
Shawn Michael De Duco

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/etd-project
Part of the Psychology Commons

Recommended Citation
De Duco, Shawn Michael, "An evolution perspective of coalition formation within organizations" (2000).
Theses Digitization Project. 1606.
https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/etd-project/1606

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the John M. Pfau Library at CSUSB ScholarWorks. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Theses Digitization Project by an authorized administrator of CSUSB ScholarWorks.
For more information, please contact scholarworks@csusb.edu.

An Evolutionary Perspective of Coalition Formation Within
Organizations

A Project
Presented to the

Faculty of

California State University,
San Bernardino

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Science
in

Psychology

by
Shawn Michael Del Duco
June 2000

An Evolutionary Perspective of Coalition Formation Within
Organizations

A Project
Presented to the

Faculty of

California State University, ^
San Bernardino

by

Shawn Michael Del Duco
June 2000

Approved by:

J^elle A>.Gilbert, Chair, Psychology

Robert E. Cramer

Mark D. Agars

0'

Date

ABSTRACT

The study of coalition formation has produced a voluminous
body of research encompassing myriad approaches. This
research primarily resides at a descriptive level of
analysis. In contrast, Tooby and Cosmides (1993) suggest
that humans have evolved adaptations that govern coalitional

behavior. The present study hypothesized that individuals
will want to form coalitions to acquire resources that were

previously unattainable. The amount and type of information
possessed by organizational members led to differences in
the desire to form coalitions. These findings extend

previous literature by addressing why coalitions form. This
research also establishes information as a resource

contributing to coalition formation. Practical implications,
limitations, and directions for-future study are provided.
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INTRODUCTION

Psychological science is currently in conceptual disarray,
characterized by un-connected mini-theories and isolated empirical

findings. We lack a theory of the functional properties of the human.,
mind that could provide the needed integration - a theory about whet the
mechanisms of mind are 'designed' to do. (Buss, 1995, p.l)

The study of coalition formation is currently in a
state of conceptual disarray. Social psychological, game
theoretic, and political models of coalition formation have

provided independent sets of investigations (Murnighan,
1978). Until recently (Tooby & CoSmides, 1993), this
research has neglected a critical functional level of
analysis. Shackelford and Buss (1996) state, "coalitions are

cross-culturally universal human relationships."(p.1151) The
prevalence of coalitions extends to Organizational contexts.
Although researchers have noted the importance of

coalitions within organizations, the concept of coalition
formation has received little attention in the empirical
study of organizations (Murnighan & Brass, 1990). An

important question for organizations is whether or when
coalitions will form (Miller & Komorita, 1986). Thus, prior

research suggests the need to examine coalition formation
within organizations.

Evolutionary psychology provides an integrative
framework for examining coalition formation within
organizations. An evolutionary approach is rare among;

applied psychologists and organizational scientists

,

(Colarelli, 1998). The evolutionary perspective in applied

psychology addresses "why" and "function" questions, while
the traditional perspective is concerned with "what" and

"how" questions (Colarelli, 1998). For example, the field of

organizational behavior has established that coalitions form

in organizations, but has not addressed why this behavior
occurs. An evolutionary perspective of coalition formation
suggests that humans have evolved a collection of

adaptations that govern coalitibnal behavior. These
adaptations have evolved to solve a recurrent problem of
resource accrual. Organizations may be regarded as pools of
resources. Information is an important resource. The present

study suggests that individuals will want to form coalitions
to acquire information. Furthermore, individuals will want
to form coalitions to acquire information.pertaining to
cheaters, or those who accept a benefit without paying a
cost.

Evolutionary Psychology

Evolutionary psychology proposes causal processes to

account for the origins of complex psychological mechanisms
(Buss, 1995). This level of innate psychological mechanisms
is a crucial link in the causal chain from the evolutionary

process to manifest behavior (Cosmides & Tooby, 1987). Buss
(1995) states, "all manifest behavior depends on underlying

psychological mechanisms."(p.1) Rather than applying
evolutionary theory directly to the level of manifest

behavior, evolutionary psychology uses evolutionary' theory
as a guide for the identification of innate psychological
mechanisms (Gosmides & Tooby, 1987),. Natural selection

:

cannot select for behaviors, but selects for psychological

mechanisms that produce behavior (Gosmides & Tooby, 1987).

Evolutionary psychology seeks to identify, understand, and
explain the nature Of psychological mechanisms by ;
articulating their functions, or the adaptive problems they
were designed by selection to solve (Buss, 1995). These

mechanisms evolve and generate manifest behavior in
interaction with environmental input (Gosmides & Tooby,

1987).

,l;.;!- :
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A central goal of evolutionary psychology is to

explicate several forms of contextual input ; (e.g. immediate
situational inputs) that activate the operation of

particular psychological mechanisms (Buss, 1996). For
example, Gosmides and Tooby (1992) empirically support the

hypothesis that the human mind is imbued with psychological
mechanisms for reasoning about social exchange. One

psychological mechanism is capable of detecting cheaters in
social exchange situations. This mechanism can only be
activated by particular contextual input, such as the

nonreciprocation of others. Buss (1996) explains, "Just as
callous-producing mechanisms are activated only if an

individual experiences repeated friction to the skin, so

psychological mechanisms...are activated only by particular

contextual input."(p.9) Therefore, evolutionary psychology
presents an interactionist framework. It does not suggest
that a particular behavior is rigid or genetically
inflexible. Rather, psychological mechanisms must be

activated by contextual input. Accordingly, "all manifest
behavior is necessarily an interactional product of

contextual input and evolved psychological
mechanisms."(p•10)

Evolved psychological mechanisms are also domain
specific. That is, what constitutes a successful solution to
an adaptive problem differs across adaptive domains (e.g.
detecting cheaters vs. avoiding snakes). For example, a fear
of snakes solves

the problem of avoiding a dangerous

environmental hazard
of which foods to

but does not solve the adaptive problem

consume (Buss, 1995). Thus, different

adaptive problems select for different adaptive solutions. A

major premise of evolutionary psychology is that

psychological mechanisms cannot be completely domain-general
because there is no such thing as a general problem. We

display great flexibility in dealing with our social
environments because we possess many complex and specific

psychological mechanisms that can be deployed individually
and in complex combinations depending on circumstances
(Buss, 1995). To summarize, evolutionary psychology suggests
that a multitude of psychological mechanisms have evolved

because of the large number and diversity of adaptive

problems faced recurrently over our evolutionary history.
These psychological mechanisms provide us with a great deal
of flexibility when interacting with our environment. This

approach radically departs from currently practiced
psychology.

Tooby and Cosmides (1989) enumerate the assumptions of
a successful psychological research paradigm: 1) the mind is

comprised of a multitude of domain-specific, psychological
mechanisms, organized into a highly intricate architecture;

2) psychological research must acknowledge function; 3)
research needs to emphasize the discovery and

characterization of psychological mechanisms as adaptations,
rather than the description and analysis df behavior; 4)

"models of psychological phenomena need to be expressed in
an algorithmic, procedural form, or at least as structured

and well-specified 'cause and effect' models, instead of in

vague, qualitative descriptions, or as patterns found in
behavior;"(p.32) and 5) evolutionary biology provides the
needed framework to incorporate these notions.
Evolutionary psychology provides a powerful explanatory

framework capable of integrating isolated empirical findings

in psychological science. Specifically, psychological
science has amassed many interesting descriptions and
important empirical generalizations (Buss, 1996).
Evolutionary psychology generates reasoned connections among
these disparate empirical findings. Psychological science

primarily resides at a descriptive level of analysis, while
evolutionary psychology addresses, a critical functional
level of analysis.

Harcourt and DeWaal (1992) contend that the causal

analysis of most social scientists resides almost

exclusively at a proximate level of explanation. Proximate

explanations include the direct experiences, stimuli, and
situations that evoke a particular behavior. In contrast,

ultimate explanations of behavior attempt to account for how

a particular behavior originated. Evolutionary theorists
address both levels of explanation.

According to Buss (1996), "Posing why questions

requires that we turn our attention toward two key issues:
(1) the origins of whatever psychological mechanisms we

possess,"(p.3) and (2) the functions of those mechanisms, or
what problems they were designed by selection to solve. For

example, the field of astronomy not only deals with patterns
of particle matter in the universe, but also with the
origins of those patterns (Buss, 1996). Similarly, Buss
(1996) states, "Just as knowledge of physiological
mechanisms such as hearts, lungs, and livers would be

incomplete without an account of their functions (e.g. to

pump blood, to uptake oxygen, to filter toxins), knowledge
of psychological mechanisms is incomplete without knowledge
of their functions."(p•3) An evolutionary perspective is
obviously indispensable for understanding complex phenomena.

why, then, have researchers neglected this critical
perspective?

Although it has been discredited for decades, the

lingering and erroneous association with social Darwinism

probably discouraged applied researchers from pursuing
practical applications of■evolutionary theory (Colarelli,
1998) . Schaller and Crandall (1999) argue that scientific
progress "depends on the publication of ideas that transcend

accepted wisdom. However, compared with older, more familiar
ideas, brand-new ideas are perceived to have a greater

likelihood of being wrong."(p•778) Colarelli (1998)

emphasizes the importance of an evolutionary perspective for
organizations.
Importance of Evolutionary Psychology for organizations

Applied psychologists would undoubtedly benefit from an
evolutionary perspective. Evolutionary psychology provides

an integrative framework that is capable of generating
meaningful and reasoned connections between seemingly

disparate empirical findings in organizational literature,
In addition, an evolutionary perspective holds the promise
of occupying an important place in organizational theory

because organizations present many complex and distinct

problems. Colarelli (1998) states, "evolved cognitive
capacities, combined with mundane experience, allow people
to build up useful reservoirs of knowledge and decision-

making algorithms. Although fallible, these reservoirs and

algorithms allow people to manage reasonably effectively in
a complex reality

(p-1049) We display great flexibility in

dealing with organizational environments because we have
evolved many complex and specific psychological mechanisms.
Therefore, it is important to explain the nature of those

psychological mechanisms by articulating their functions, or
the specific problems they were designed to solve.
Organizational coalitions

Coalitions play an integral role in organizations. For

example, coalitions allow members to exert considerably more
influence than they could as individual employees. By

forming a coalition, individuals have the opportunity to
affect organizational decisions, policies, and reward
structures. The concept of "coalition" has been prominent in
organizational literature for over 35 years. Stevenson,
Pearce, and Porter (1985) define a coalition as "an

interacting group of individucils, deliberately constructed,
independent of the formal structure, lacking its own
internal structure, consisting of mutually perceived

membership, issue oriented, focused on a goal or goals
external to the coalition, and requiring concerted mfember

action."(p.261) Although this definition is widely accepted
by researchers, Murnighan and Brass (1990) offer a more
concise definition: "a coalition is composed of two or more

individuals who have coalesced as a political unit to

address a particular issue."(p.285) These researchers

identify coalition members and discuss the formation
.process."', . ^ '

:

The founder of an drganiza.tional coalition defines an

issue or identifies an issue as important. Founders \
establish themselves as the center of the coalition's

■

commuhication network (Murnighan'6c Brass, 1990). Founders

must acquire knowledge of others' preferences regarding a
particular issue. Pfeffer,(1981) agrees that coalition
formation requires information that one member's interests
are congruent with another's. Thus, a successful founder

must be well connected (Murhighan & Brass, 1990).

Gnce the founder hah identified ah important issue,: the
recruitment of key allies begins. Murnighan and Brass (1990)
state that successful contacts depend largely on proximity
and/or fortuitous encounters, but "the founder may calculate
who to approach first, who to avoid, how to time the initial
contacts, and how to proceed further."(p.290) Coalitions
form incrementally, by adding one member at a time. Thus,

initial coalition contacts are dyadic. Moreover, founders
are likely to seek just enough members to create a

sufficiently powerful coalition (Murnighan & Brass, 1990).

To summarize, successful coalitions form quietly and
disband quickly (Murnighan 6c Brass, 1990). They are merely
temporary alliances. Coalitions form in response to a
particular issue. As issues change, membership changes
(Murnighan 6c Brass, 1990). Thompson, Mannix, and Bazerman

(1988) empirically support the inherent instability of
coalitions. Thus, relatively weak ties between members

characterize coalitions. Orice formed, coalitions do not - last

long (Murnighan & Brass, 1990);:;The. field of organizational
behavior has established the existence of coalitions. In

addition, organizational behavior research has described
coalitions and the formation process. However, this research
has not addressed why organizational coalitions form.

Coping effectively in organizational environments
requires flexibility. Evolutionary psychology suggests that
we possess adaptations that provide flexibility when
confronted with coalition-choice situations. Again, the
flexibility afforded by a mind comprised of many complex and

specialized psychological mechanisms allows us to

successfully negotiate social environments. Evolutionary
psychology provides a framework that is powerful enough to
interpret behavior in an environment that poses a large
number of diverse problems - the organization.
Coalition Formation

Tooby and Cosmides (1988; as cited in van der Dennen,
1991) state that humans possess the requisite cognitive

mechanisms for observing, assessing, and regulating the

appropriate pattern of response toward coalitions.
Specifically, humans have evolved a diverse collection of
complexly specialized psychological mechanisms that govern
coalitional behavior. These adaptations "allow coalitions to

coalesce, function, and sustain themselves as groups of

cooperating individuals I'^ iToob^ & :CosmideS, 1993, p.39) In
evolutionary terms, coalition formation has enabled our
ancestors to out-compete those who did not form coalitions
(Buss, 1996).

Over evolutionary history, situations of potential or

actual cooperation allowed more effective cooperators to
gain resources denied to unallied individuals or less

effective cooperators. For example, those ancestors who were
leSs skilled hunters survived by allying themselves with
more skilled hunters. The formation of coalitions, allowed

these individuals to acquire resources (i.e., food, hunting
skills, safety) that were previously unattainable. Ancestral
resource acquisition may have been a function of the extent
to which our ancestors were reciprocally allied with others
in the local population (Shackelford-& Buss, 1996). Indeed,

poor social connections may inhibit resource acquisition.
Over evolutionary history, different resources have been
gained and lost from coalitions (Shackelford & Buss, 1996).

The human proclivity to form coalitions has a long

evolutionary history (Harcourt & DeWaal, 1992). Coalition
formation clearly affects the distribution of resources. In
fact, some researchers contend that coalitions determine

access to resources (Harcourt & DeWaal, 1992). The notion
that coalitions determine access to resources stems from

earlier research regarding coalition formation.

'

Traditional approaches to coalition formation

Research regarding coalition formation is characterized

by little overlap (Murnighan, 1978). Similar to other areas
of psychological science, coalition research has yielded

disparate empirical findings. Three areas have cpntributed
independent sets of investigations: social psychological,;
game theoretic, and political models of coalition formatioh
(Murnighan, 1978).

.

Caplow (1956) proposed the first social psychological

model of coalition formation. He examined the tendency of a
triad to become a coalition of two against one. Srtiall

differences in power, activity, and other member
characteristics exert considerable influence upon the

formation of coalitions. Caplow (1956) states, "the .

'

formation of given coalitions depends upon the initial

distribution of power in the triad."(p.489) He presents a
typology of coalitions. For example, one triad might consist
of member A, whose power (controlling of resources) exceeds

that of member B, whose power exceeds a third member; C.
Caplow (1956) suggested that C can extract resources from B
in return for entering the coalition BC, "despite the fact
that B is stronger."(p.492) Thus, "the nature of the triadic
situation often favors the weak over the strong."(p.490)

The "weakness-is-strength" effect (Miller & -Komorita,
1986) suggests that those who are weak in resources are more
likely to be included in coalitions than those who are
■ ■ ■ ■ 12'

strong in resources. Mannix and White (1992) demonstrate

that those with fewer resources are more likely to be
included in a coalition. In contrast, those who must invest
greater resources are less likely to join a coalition

(Miller & Komorita, 1986). Thus, individuals are more likely
to form a coalition the more they have to gain by doing so.
Additional social psychological approaches to coalition

formation are bargaining theory and the weighted probability
model. Bargaining theory and the weighted probability model
predict that coalitions with few members will be the most

common (Murnighan, 1978). As opposed to the static

predictions provided by other models of coalition formation,
bargaining theory offers differential predictions based on

the quality of members' alternatives. Bargaining theory
predicts that members' rewards will change over time. These
"predictions are based on the use of alternative coalitions

as threats during coalition bargaining."(Murnighan, 1978,
p.1136) An advantage of the weighted probability model is

that it offers exact predictions for the probabilities of
several different coalitions. This model assumes that

individuals will attempt to maximize their rewards. However,
unlike bargaining theory, determination of the predicted
rewards depends on the quantity of a member's alternatives

(Murnighan, 1978). A member with twice as many alternatives
as another member is predicted to receive a payoff that is
13

twice the size of the other member's (Murhighan, 1978),
Game theoretic models of Goalition formation focus
primarily on game characteristics rather than coalition

members. Specifically, game theory emphasizes a coalition's
payoffs, Or the rewards accrued- to each coalition member.

Lawler and Youngs (1975) found that payoff is the least
important determinant of coalition choices. Instead,

attitudinal agreement emerged as the most important basis of
Coalitional decisions. This finding contradicts an

assumption of evolutionary psychology. Evolutionary
psychologists assume that individuals form coalitions to

achieve what cannot be achieved alone, regardless of the
attitudinal agreement between members.

Political models of coalitional behavior emphasize a
long-term consideration: the expectation of outcomes

resulting from the formation of a particular coalition.

Examples of political models include Riker's size principle,

the policy distance'::itihimizatiph?'model, ^ahd'the miniinum
range - conflict of interest model. Riker's size principle
adheres to several strict assumptions for predicting the

size of political coalitions. The model predicts that

minimum winning coalitions will form, whereby removal of a
single member would render a coalition no longer winning

:

(Murnighan, 1978). "A minimum winning coalition controls the
smallest amount of resources necessary to realize

success."(Murnighan, 1978, p.1139) The policy distance

minimization model allows for the possibility of larger:than

minimum winning coalitions. The minimum range - conflict of
interest model is based on the notion that members with

similar ideologies will be the most likely coalition
partners (Murnighan, 1978)

Little overlap exists in this body of literature
(Murnighan, 1978). To apply any of these models to real

coalition situations, we must consider the: utility of each

approach. Social psychology's emphasis on a member's

resources, game theory's emphasis on coalitional payoffs,
and the political emphasis on ideological similarity provide
a Cursory description of coalition formation. This research

has provided important findings. However, similar to other

areas, coalition research has failings. :Buss (1995) states

that a descriptive level of analysis avoids "entirely the
key questions of the origins and functions of the social

phenomenon documented."(p.i7) An evolutionary perspective of

coalition formation will generate meaningful and reasoned
connections between social psychological and game theoretic
approaches. Specifically, the notion of coalitional
psychology jointly addresses coalition members' resources

and the rewards accrued to each member by forming a

coalition. Similar to other models, evolutionary psychology
suggests that individuals will form coalitions to acquire
resources that were previously unattainable. This propensity
to form coalitions solved a specific adaptive problem

recurrently faced by our ancestors over our evolutionary
history - resource accrual. Therefore, an evolutionary
approach will integrate seemingly disparate areas of

research by focussing upon the adaptive function of
coalition formation.

Coalition formation within organizations

Murnighan (1986) views coaliti'ons as a necessity. The
majority of organizational coalitions follow the same basic
process: one individual contacts another. The individual who
cannot achieve what he or she desires without assistance

(i.e., without a coalition) typically initiates action
(Murnighan, 1986). Altering resource allocations is a major
goal of coalitions (Stevenson, Pearce, & Porter, 1985).
Stevenson, Pearce, and Porter (1985) present two

hypotheses: 1) a major change - an increase, decrease, or
reallocation in resources - increases the likelihood of

coalition formation; and 2) unfavorable contrasts between

one's own position relative to comparable others will also
increase the likelihood of coalition formation.

The organization may be regarded as a pool of resources
varying in attainability. This variation, particularly a

scarcity of resources, "increases the vigor with which
different parts of the organization conflict with one
another."(Notz, Starke, & Atwell, 1983, p.149) Pearce,
Stevenson, and Porter (1986) argue that the more scarce the

resources, the greater the coalition activity. Pfeffer

16

(1981) states that coalition formation "willbe more

prevalent to the extent that there is more task and resource

interdependence within the organization

(p,157) In

contrast, coalition formation will be reduced within

environments of resburce abundance or less interdependence.
White (1974) defines an organization as a "formally
constituted collectivity which utilizes resources

(p.367)

He views resources as determinants of organizational
behavior. The influence of scarce resources (including

information) imposes constraints on behavior (White, 1974).
These constraints on individuals are attributable to: 1) the

limits of utilization of resources controlled by the
organization;:and 2) the flows of resources necessary for
their utilization. White (1974) provides an•example of the
Nambikwara hunters and gatherers in South America. The
population is organized in bands Of followers and a leader

(the most skilled hunter). Those less skilled in hunting

must ally themselves with more skilled hunters if they are
to survive. Coalitions offer an important source of power
and influence.

Coalitions form because they allow members to exert

more influence than they could independently (Stevenson,
Pearce, & Porter, 1985). Many employees do not possess the

power to acquire resources, so they form coalitions (Mannix
& White> 1992). The formation of coalitions offers an

opportunity for disadvantaged employees "to garner power
■17
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through the pooling of resources with other group
members."(Mannix & White, 1992, p.201) The more critical and
important the resource, the greater the power of the member
who is instrumental in providing the resource (Pfeffer,

1981). Thus, power depends on the possession of resources
(Pfeffer, 1982).

To summarize, organizational coalitions form because
they enable individual employees to achieve what cannot be

achieved alone. Specifically, coalitions serve the important
function of resource accrual. Organizations present an
environment characterized by limited resources. The

individual success of employees depends on their ability to
form coalitions with other employees. The formation of
organizational coalitions provides access to resources that

are individually unattainable. Important organizational
resources include special skills, effort, votes, money, and
information (Miller & Komorita, 1986).
Information

Information is a source of power within organizations
(Cobb, 1986). The control of information is an important
aspect of the resource ■ allocation process in organizations
(Pfeffer, 1982). The hierarchical arrangement of positions

implies that the organization bestows more information on
the more highly placed members. In addition, the information
which people have access to in organizational contexts is
often limited and ambiguous.

18

Members of an organization have limited access to
information (Pfeffer, 1982). Constraints on communication

among organizational members can further restrict the
availability of information (Miller & Komorita, 1986).
Individuals are likely to form coalitions with those they
can communicate with directly, rather than with others with

whom they can communicate only indirectly.
Information is an important organizational resource.
However, the organization imposes constraints on the

availability of information, such as organizational position
and communication networks. These constraints can create

"information scarcities" and therefore are likely to yield

coalitions between organizational members. Past coalition

theory and research has attempted to determine why
individuals choose to join one coalition rather than another
in a forced coalition-choice situation (Lawler & Youngs,

1975). An important question in organizational contexts is
whether or when coalitions will form (Miller & Komorita,
1986).

Similar to other models, evolutionary psychology claims
that coalition formation enables individuals to acquire

resources that were previously unattainable. A logical
extension of this premise is that those with fewer resources

will have a greater need to form coalitions. Thus,
individuals"with fewer resources will be more likely to want

to form a coalition than those possessing greater resources.

19

In addition, the "weakness-is-strength" effect (Miller &

Komorita, 1986) predicts that those with fewer resources are
more likely to be included in coalitions than those

possessing greater resources. Conversely, those with greater
resources are less likely to join a coalition (Miller &
Komorita, 1986). The present study provides a direct test of
these predictions.
Furthermore, this study seeks to demonstrate that

information is an important organizational resource that
contributes to coalition formation. According to Miller and
Komorita- (1986), "few studies have systematically

manipulated information and communication variables."(p•125)
In addition, "very little is known about the effects of
information and communication restrictions on coalition

behavior."(p.126) A relationship between information and
coalition formation would lend further credence to the

evolutionary notion of coalitional psychology. The present

study offers a test of the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: Differences in the amount of information
will lead to differences in the desire to form coalitions.

Hypothesis la: Individuals with less information will
be more likely to want to form coalitions.

Hypothesis lb: Individuals with more information will
be less likely to want to form coalitions.

20

The first hypothesis considers the amount of

, >

information possessed. Evolutionary psychology not only
provides the framework to examine information as a resource
contributing to coalition formation, but also allows

predictions based on type of information. As mentioned

'

previously, Cosmides and Tooby (1992) identify a
psychological mechanism enabling the detection of cheaters

in social exchange situations. Over evolutionary history,
those ancestors capable of successfully detecting cheaters:
were able to out-compete those less skilled at detecting
cheaters.

Paleoanthropological evidence reveals that our

ancestors have engaged in social exchange for several

million years (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992). "Social exchange
behavior is both Universal and highly elaborated across all
human cultures."(Cosmides & Tooby, 1992, p.164) Cosmides and
Tooby (1992) explore the hypothesis that the human mind

contains psychological mechanisms designed for reasoning

about social exchange, including a mechanism for detecting
cheaters in social exichange situations.

Cosmides and Tooby (1992) define, cheating as a
violation of a social contract. A social contract is "a

situation in which an individual is obligated to satisfy a
requirement of some kind, usually at some cost to him- or

"

: 21 , '

herself, in order to be entitled to receive a benefit from

another individual (or group)

(p•180) A wealth of empirical

evidence supports the view that individuals possess
cognitive adaptations specialized for detecting cheaters.
Cosmides and Tooby (1992) provide- evidence that humans
are highly skilled at detecting violations of conditional
rules that express social contracts. Furthermore, this

competency is realized regardless of individuals'
familiarity with the content of the social contract. These

findings (as well as others) suggest several features of
social exchange adaptations.

First, the algorithms that govern reasoning about
social contracts include psychological mechanisms that are

specialized for cheater detection. Second, these algorithms
operate even in unfamiliar situations. Finally, the
algorithms "cannot operate so as to detect cheaters unless

the rule has been assigned the cost-benefit representation
of a social contract."(Cosmides & Tooby, 1992, p.206)
To summarize, the human mind is imbued with

psychological mechanisms for reasoning about social
exchange. One psychological mechanism is capable of
detecting cheaters in social exchange situations. This
mechanism can only be activated by particular contextual
input, such as the nonreciprocation of others. This research

22

suggests that individuals will be especially cognizant of

information regarding cheating behavior. Furthermore,

individuals may value cheating information more than other
types of information. This preference may have had an
influence on ancestral coalition formation. That is, our

evolutionary ancestors might have been more likely to form
coalitions with those possessing cheating information. This
is particularly relevant to organizational behavior. For
example, employees may regard equity (equity theory; Adams,
1965) as important for success within the organization/
which creates a need to be recognized for their efforts.
Cheaters can be viewed as those employees who accept

recognition without putting forth effort (i.e;, profitable
inequity). Identifying cheaters is important for maintaining
an equitable (and satisfying) work environment. The present
study offers a test of the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: Differences in the type of information
will lead to differences in the desire to form coalitions.

Hypothesis 2a: Individuals will be more likely to want
to form coalitions with those possessing cheating
information than with those possessing other types of
information.
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METHOD

,

.

Participants

A total of 151 students were recruited from several

sections of undergraduate psychology courses at California
State University, San Bernardino to participate in the
study. Students received extra credit for their research

participation. Seventy-six percent of the participants were
female and 24% were male. Seven percent of the participants
were African-American, 5%, were Asian, 60% were Caucasian,

18% were Hispanic, and 10% of the participants indicated

Other ethnic backgrounds. The age of the participants ranged
from 18 to 58 (M = 25.29, SD = 7.89), with the majority

(70%) falling between 18 and 25 years of age.
Measure

Each participant completed bne form of an

organizational behavior survey. The surveys consisted of two
scenarios and several questions (see Appendix). The use of
scenarios to test the hypotheses was undertaken for several
reasons. First, this scenario-based approach is more

feasible than a field design. The use of scenarios provides
an adequate test of the hypotheses and avoids the arduous

task of collecting coalition data in an actual brganization.
In addition, the organizational scenarios provide a context,
albeit constructed, for the activation of the psychological

mechanism enabling coalition formation: Evolutionary
psychology maintains that psychological mechanisms are
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Gontext-dependent. As stated earlier," psychological
mechanisms can only be activated by particiilar contextual
input. A goal of evolutionary psychology is to explicate
several forms of contextual input (e.g. immediate

situational inputs) that activate the operation of

particular psychological mechanisms. It is necessary to
provide a context so that a psychological mechanism can be
activated.

Organizational Scenarios A and B represent Hypotheses 1
and 2, respectively. In Organizational Scenario A, each
participant read:

Assume you are a manager in Xanadu, Inc. Xanadu has recently ,

experienced dramatic reductions in customers. The company web page has
successfully attracted many new customers in the.past. However, Xanadu's
web page has not been updated for several years./Therefore, the

president qf Xanadu has asked four.department managers to provide
designs for a new company web page / The department or .departments (if.
managers choose to work together) providing the best design will receive

an increase in important resources (like more money and more staff

positions). If managers work together and provide the. best design, they
will have to divide .the resources among themselves. The department
managers selected to participate in the design:of a new company web page
are A, B, G, and D.

Approximately half (n= 74) of the participants read
that they were the manager of Department A (who possessed
little information):

As the manager of Department A, you lack technological
information., You have only been an employee:of Xanadu for three months,
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and you are not yet completely familiar with your position. The manager
of Department B possesses a similar amount of technological information.
In contrast, the managers of departments C and D possess a

tremendous amount of technological information. In ;fact, these managers
have been employees of Xanadu for over three years,.and are very

familiar with their positions.

;

'

ApprOXimately half (n = 75) of the participants read
that they were the manager of Department D; (who possessed a
great amount of information):

As the manager of Department D, you possess a tremendous amount Of

technological information. You have been an employee of Xanadu for' over

three years, and you are very familiar with your position. The manager
of Department C possesses a similar amount of technological information.
In contrast, the managers of departments A and B lack

technological information. These managers have only been employees of

Xanadu for three months, and are not yet completely familiar with their
positions.

The two forms of Organizational Scenario A represent

two levels of quantity of information. Hypothesis 1 states
that differences in the amount of information will lead to

differences in the desire to form coalitions. Participants

read that, by providing the best design for a new company
web page, they will receive an increase in important
resources. The task, of designing the web page is likely to

be facilitated by the possession of technological
information. Those that possess technological information
are expected to be viewed as more likely to provide the best

design for the web page (thereby receiving an increase in
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important resources) than those lacking technological
information. In addition, participants are provided with an
opportunity to work with others, which may improve their
likelihood of providing the best design for the web page and
receiving an increase in resources. The amount of

information possessed by manag'ers is intended to capture the

hierarchical arrangement of positions within organizations.
Managers C and D possess more information than managers A

and B presumably because of their job tenure.
The scenario was followed by four questions that

assessed whether the participants received the manipulation
as intended. Participants were asked to indicate the amount

of technological information possessed by each department
manager. Responses could range from 1 to 5 and were anchored

as follows: 1 = No information, 2 = Little information, 3 =
Moderate amount of information, 4 = Much information, 5 =

Great amount of information. Participants were also asked to
rate the likelihood of a series of actions that could be

taken to design the new company web page. These actions

included working with each department manager and designing
the web page alone. Again, it was expected that those with
less information (the manager of Department A) would be more

likely to want to form coalitions than those possessing a
great amount of information (the manager of Department D).
Responses could range from 1 to 5 and were anchored as

27

follows: 1 = Will not do, 2 = Not very likely, 3 = Somewhat

likely, A = Very likely, 5 = Will do.
■

In Organizational Scenario B, participants read:

Assume you are a manager in Utopia, Inc. Utopia has recently , ,

experienced dramatic reductions in customers,, The company web page, has
successfully attracted many new customers in the past. However, Utopia's
web page has not been updated for several years. Therefore, the

president of Utopia has asked four department managers to provide
designs for a new company web page. The department pr departments (if
managers choose to work together) providing the best design will receive

an increase in important resources (like., more money and more staff

positions). If managers work together and .provide the best design, they
will have to divide the resources among themselves.^ The department
managers selected to participate In the design: of a new company web page
are A, B, C, and D. You are the manager of Department D.

Manager A possesses ihformat'ion,:abbut graphid design. In fact.

Manager A has improved the artistic quality,of, past projects. Manager B
possesses customer relations information. Manager B has an understanding

of customer needs. Manager C possesses; information About which managers
at Utopia are likely to use trickery (e.g., stealing other managers'

ideas) to compete for scarce resources. You are Manager D. As Manager D,
you possess information regarding only your department and genera;l job
;duties. ■

This scenario presents different types of information.

Hypothesis 2 states that differences in the type of
:information will lead to differences in the desire, to form

coalitions. Participants read again that, by providing the /
best design for a new company web page, they will receive an

increase in important resources. Providing the best design
for the web page is likely to be facilitated by the
possession of a particular type of information (i.e.,
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information about which managers are likely to steal other
managers' ideas while competing for scarce resources). Those
that possess cheating information are expected to be viewed

as more likely to provide the best design for the web page
(thereby receiving an increase in important resources) than

those possessing other types of information (e.g., customer

relations information). Again, participants are provided

with an opportunity to work with others, which may improve
their likelihood of providing the best design for the web
page and receiving an increase in resources. Over

evolutionary history, those ancestors capable of
successfully detecting cheaters were able to out-compete

those less skilled at detecting cheaters. This suggests that
individuals may be especially cognizant of information

regarding cheating behavior, as opposed to other types of

information. Furthermore, individuals may value cheating
information more than other types of information. Therefore,
our ancestors may have been more likely to form coalitions

with those possessing cheating information than with those
possessing other types of information.
Four questions assessed whether the manipulation was

received as intended. Participants were asked: "Which
manager possesses information regarding graphic design?,"

"Which manager possesses information about the ways that
other managers might cheat?," "Which manager possesses
information regarding only their own job duties?," "Which
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manager possesses customer relations information?."

Participants were also asked to rate the likelihood of a

series of actions that could be taken to design the new
company web page (e.g., "How likely are you to work with
Manager A, as opposed tb B or C?"). These actions included

working with each department manager (as opposed to the
other managers) and designing the web page alone. It was
expected that individuals would be more likely to want to

form coalitions with those possessing cheating information
(Manager C) than with those possessing other types of

information (managers A or B). It was also expected that
individuals would be more likely to want to form coalitions

with those possessing cheating information (Manager C) than
design the web page alone. Responses could range from 1 to 5

and were anchored as follows: 1 =Will not do, 2 = Not very

likely, 3 = Somewhat likely, 4 = Very likely, 5 = Will do.
Procedure

Initial versions of the organizational behavior surveys
were pilot tested. Results from these preliminary tests were
satisfactory. That is, pilot testing revealed' that the
manipulations for each organizational scenario were received

as intended. For the primary data collection, students were
asked to participate in a study of organizational behavior.

They were instructed to read each scenario carefully and
respond to the accompanying questions. Participants were

also informed that they would be participating in a
^ 30 ■

simulated business exercise during the last phase of the
study. They were to use the information provided in the
scenarios while participating in the exercise. Students did
not participate in a simulated business exercise. This

statement was included among the directions for completing
the survey to enhance the involvement of the participants.
Presentation of the two scenarios was counterbalanced

to reduce the possible influence of order effects. Seventyfive participants completed surveys that presented
Organizational Scenario A before Organizational Scenario B.
Seventy-four participants were presented with Organizational
Scenario B followed by Organizational Scenario A. Data from
these forms was compared to determine whether the order of

presenting the two scenarios influenced participants'
responses.
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RESULTS^

All analyses were performed using SPSS. Mean
comparisons were initially conducted to determine if order
effects were present (i.e., the extent to which

counterbalancing influenced participant responses). A total

of 16 t-tests were cohducted betwepn the cpunterbalahced
forms. Due to the large number of tests, the Bonferroni
adjustment for Type I error was employed. Dividing the
desired alpha level (a = .05) by the total number of tests

(16) yielded a conservative alpha level (a = .003) to
evaluate each t-test. As shown in Table 1, no significant
differences emerged between the two forms. In the absence of

meaningful order effects, only two forms of the survey were

considered for subsequent analyses: those respondents
possessing "less" information in Organizational Scenario A

and those respondents possessing a "great amount" of

information. All of the respondents completed Organizational
Scenario B.

-

!

A manipulation check was conducted to ensure that the

manipulation for Organizational Scenario A was. received as

intended. A within-subjects ANOVA was performed for the

first four questions following Organizational Scenario A
("How much technological information does the Department A
manager possess? Department B manager? Department C manager?
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Table 1

t-tests: Counterbalanced forms (by question)

Question

Scenario Aql

Scenario Aq2

Scenario Aq3

Scenario Aq4

Scenario Aq5a

Scenario Aq5b

Scenario Aq5c

Scenario Aq5d

Scenario Bql

Scenario Bq2

Survey form

n

M

1

38

2.16

2

35

1.89

1

38

2.18

2

35

1.97

1

38

4.76

2

35

4.74

1

38

4.76

2

35

4.66

1

38

2.47

2

36

2.00

1

38

1.87

2

36

1.94

1

38

4.29

2

36

4.33

1

38

4.24

2

36

4.25

1

38

1.13

2

36

1.01

1

38

2.97

2

36

2.97

33

t

2~value

1.47

.15

1.43

16

15

88

67

51

2.10

04

-.32

.75

-.28

.78

-.07

.95

.74

47

.02

.98

Table 1 (continued)

Question

Scenario Bq3

Scenario Bq4

Scenario BqSa

Scenario BqSb

Scenario BqSc

Scenario Bq5d

Scenario Aql

Scenario Aq2

Scenario Aq3

Scenario Aq4

Survey form

n

M

1

38

3.97

2

36

3.86

1

38

2.07

2

36

2.06

1

38

3.50

2

36

3.56

1

C.,/\,:3;8'

1.97

2

- 36:'

2/19

.1'

38

;2.55;

2

36

2.25

1

38'

3.42

2

36

3.33

3

38

1.92

4:

37

2.03

3

38

:l-95;

4;;

37

2.00

3

38

4.18

4

37

4.43

3 ^

38

4.52

4

37

4.62

34

t.

;£-value

1.13

.26

.33

.74

-.22

.83

-.88

.38

1.33

19

.40

69

-.64 ,

.53

-.36

72

-1.44

15

-.49

.63

Table 1 (continued)

Question

Scenario Aq5a

Scenario Aq5b

Scenario AqSc

Scenario Aq5d

Scenario Bql

Scenario Bq2

Scenario Bq3

Scenario Bq4

Scenario BqSa

Scenario BqSb

Scenario BqSc

Survey form

n

M

3

38

2.16

4

37

2.51

3

38

3.42

4

37

3.24

3

38

3.76

4

37

3.57

3

38

2.11

4

37

2.43

3

39

1.08

4

37

1.00

3

39

2.97

4

37

2.95

3

39

3.69

4

37

3.92

3

39

1.97

4

37

1.97

3

38

3.55

4

37

3.70

3

38

2.18

4

37

2.32

3

38

2.29

4

37

2.51

35

t

2-value

-1.52

.13

.71

.48

.85

.40

-1.48

.14:

1.32

.19

.49

.63

-1.43

.16

.03

.98

-.56

.58

-.73

.47

-1.08

.29

Table 1 (continued)

Question

Scenario Bq5d

Survey form

n

M

3

38

3.34

4

37

3.14

36

t

^-value

.94

.35

Department D manager?"). The overall test was significant:,
F{3, 146) = 299.98, p < .001. Comparisons employing the

Bonferroni adjustment evaluated the mean differences between

each item. It was expected that respondents would view
managers A and B as possessing relatively less information, '

while managers C and D would be viewed as possessing great
amounts of information. The Department A manager was viewed
as possessing significantly less information (M = 2.00) than
the Department C manager (M = 4.52), mean difference =

2.52, p < .001. The Department A manager was also viewed as
possessing significantly less information (M = 2.00) than

the Department D manager (M = 4.64), mean difference = 
2.64, p < .001. Similarly, the Department B manager was
viewed as possessing significantly less information (M 
2.03) than the Department C manager (M = 4.52), mean

difference = -2.50, p < .001. The Department B manager was

also viewed as possessing significantly less information (M
= 2.03) than the Department D manager (M =4.64), mean

difference = -2.61, p < .001. As expected, the. quantity of

information possessed by the managers of departments A and B
did not significantly differ. The manager of Department D

was viewed as possessing a signifieantly greater amount of
information (M = 4..64) than the Department C manager (M =
4,52), mean difference = .114, p < .05. This finding was
unexpected. A close examination of the two means suggests
that the difference is negligible. Thus, the results
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revealed that the manipulation for the first scenario was
received as intended.

A manipulation check for Organizational Scenario B was

conducted. A series of chi-square goodness of fit tests were
conducted for the first four questions following

Organizational Scenario B ("Which manager possesses
information regarding graphic design? Information about the
ways that other managers might cheat? Information regarding
only their own job duties? Customer relations

information?"). Chi-square tests were performed because
there were "correct" and "incorrect" response options for
each question. This analysis enabled the examination of the

frequencies of "correct" and "incorrect" responses. For
example, respondents were expected to correctly identify
Manager A as possessing information regarding graphic

design. SPSS requires a minimum of one expected frequency to
be specified for each response category. So, for each

goodness of fit test, it was specified that the majority of
participants (145 of a possible 151) would endorse the

"correct" option, while two participants would mistakenly
endorse each of the three remaining "incorrect" options.
Each of the obtained chi-square values failed to reach

significance. One-hundred and forty-five participants
correctly identified Manager A as possessing information

regarding graphic design,

(3) - i.oo, p > .20. Similarly,

143 participants correctly identified Manager C as
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possessing cheating information, x^(3) = 5.03, p > .10.
Manager D was correctly identified as possessing information

regarding simple job duties by 142 participants, %i(3) =
4.56, p > .20. One-hundred and forty-three subjects
correctly identified Manager B as possessing customer

relations Information, xM3) = 3.03, p > .30. These results
support the goodness of fit of the expected values.
Therefore, the manipulation for the second scenario was

received as intended, with respondents correctly identifying
the type of information possessed by" each;department
manager.

To test Hypothesis 1, t-tests were initially performed
to evaluate the mean differences between the two forms

(participants with less information and those possessing a
great amount of information) for responses to Organizational

Scenario A questions. This analysis compared responses to
the three questions that were identical across both forms of

Organizational Scenario A ("How likely are you to work with

the Department B manager? Department C manager? Design the

web page by yourself?"). Each t-test was based on a priori
expectations. Participants with less information were

expected to report a greater likelihood of wanting to form a

coalition with the manager of Department C (who possessed a
great amount of information) than those possessing a great
amount of information. Those possessing a great amount of
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information were expected to report a greater likelihood of
wanting to design the web page alone (i.e., not form a

coalition) than participants with less information. Finally,,
participants with lesh information were expected to report a
greater likelihood of wanting to form a coalition with the
manager of Department B (who also possessed little

information) than those possessing a great amount of
information. As shown in Table 2, those with less

information were more likely to work with the Depa.rtment C
manager (M =4.31) than those possessing a great amount of
information (M = 3.67), "t(147) = 4.66, p < .001. This result

supports Hypothesis 1. Also supporting Hypothesis 1, those
possessing a great amount of information reported a

significantly greater likelihood of designing the web page
alone (M = 3.33) than those with less information (M =

1.91), t(147) = 8.33, p< .001. Those with less information
did not report a greater likelihood of wanting to work with
the Department B manager (M = 2.24) than those possessing a
great amount of information (M = 2.33), t(147) = -.547, ns,

which does not support Hyppthesis 1 (see Table 2).

\

In the first test of Hypothesis 1, it is possible that

participants may have chosen only one of the managers among
the coalition-choice options, as opposed to choosing to form
a coalition with all of the managers. Therefore, a second
test of Hypothesis 1 was conducted. A new variable was

created by identifying the highest value among the

Table 2

Hypothesis 1: t-tests

Work with Manager B

Less information

More information

M

M

SD

SD

t

2.24

.99

2.33

1.02

-.55

Work alone

1.91

1.01

3.33

1.08

-8.33*

Work with Manager C

4.31

.66

3.67

.99

4.66*

(less information)

(great amount of
information)

"U < .001.
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coalition-choice options for each respondent. It was
expected that participants with less information would

report a greater likelihood of forming a coalition, once a

choice to form a coalition across managers was made, than
those possessing a great amount of information.

A t-test

was conducted to assess whether those with less information

were more likely to form a coalition than those possessing a
great amount of information. The results supported this

hypothesis. Those with less information were more likely to
form a coalition with a department manager (M = 4.35) than
those possessing a great amount of information (M = 3.83),

t(147) = 3.93, p < .001. An additional analysis was
conducted to determine whether age of respondents was
related to reported likelihood of coalition formation. It
was not, r (146) = .03, p > '. 10.

Finally, a third test of Hypothesis 1 was conducted. A
within-subjects ANOVA was performed to examine differences
regarding which managers the participants wanted to form a

coalition with to design the web page. Analyses were
initially conducted for participants with little
information. Again, the two forms of the scenario were
constructed so that approximately half (n = 74) of the

participants read that they were the manager of Department A
(who possessed little information). These participants were
asked a question regarding the likelihood of working with
the Department D manager. In contrast, approximately half (n
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= 75) of the participants read that they were the manager of
Department D (who possessed a great amount of information).

These participants were asked a question regarding the

likelihood of working with the Department A manager. Thus,

the differences between the two forms required analyzing the
responses to the four questions separately for each form.

Participants with less information were expected to report a
greater likelihood of forming a coalition with the managers
of departments C and D (who possessed great amounts of

information) than with the manager of Department B (who
possessed little information). The overall test was

significant, F(2, 72) =97.49 , p < .001. Participants with

less information did report a greater likelihood of working
with the Department C manager, who possessed a great amount
of information (M = 4.31), than working with manager B, who
possessed less information (M = 2.24), mean difference =

2.07, p < .001. Similarly, participants with less

information were more likely to work with manager D, who
possessed a great amount of information (M = 4.24), than

with manager B (M = 2.24), mean difference = 2.00, p < .001.
There was not a significant difference regarding the

likelihood of working with mahagers C or D. These results
support the expectations. Analyses were repeated for those

possessing a great amount of information. It was expected
that those possessing a great amount of information would
not report a preference for forming a coalition with the
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managers of departments A, B, or C. The overall test

statistic was significant, F(2, 73) = 41.36, p < .001.
Interestingly, those respondents possessing a great amount
of information reported a greater likelihood of working with
the Department C manager (M = 3.67), who also possessed a

great amount of information, than the Department B manager
(M = 2.33), mean difference = 1.33, or the Department A
manager, who possessed little information (M = 2.27), mean

difference = 1.40, ps < .001. This result was unexpected.
There was not a significant difference regarding the

likelihood of working with managers A or B, who possessed
similar amounts of information.

To test Hypothesis 2, a within-subjects ANOVA was
conducted for responses to Organizational Scenario B

questions. Again, respondents were expected to report a
greater likelihood of forming a coalition with Manager C
(who possessed cheating information) than with managers A or
B, or designing the web page alone. As shown in Table 3, a

priori contrasts revealed that participants were less likely
to work with Manager C, who possessed information regarding
cheaters (M = 2.39), than work with Manager A, who possessed

graphic design information (M = 3.58), F(l, 149) = 87.34, p
< .001. Participants were also less likely to work with
Manager C

(M = 2.39) than with Manager B, who possessed

customer relations information (M = 3.31), F(l, 149) =
78.38, p< .001. These results do not support the
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Table 3

Hypothesis 2: Means and standard deviations

M

SD

3.58

1.11

Work alone

2.17

.96

Work with manager C

2.39

.94

3.31

.94

Work with manager A
(graphic design
information)

(cheating information)

Work with manager B
(customer relations

information)
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Table 4

Hypothesis 2: F-values and estimates of magnitude

Source

SS

MS

Comp. 1

211.23

1

211.23

Comp. 2

7.71

1

7.71

Comp. 3

125.13

1

125.23

Comp. 1

360.77

149

2.42

Comp. 2

208.29

149

1.40

Comp. 3

237.87

149

1.60

R2

F

87.24**

.37

5.51*

.04

78.38**

.35

error

Note. Comp. 1 = work with manager A (graphic design

information) compared to manager C (cheating information);
Comp. 2 = work with manager C, compared to work alone; Comp.
3 = work with manager B (customer relations information)
cdmpared to manager C.

.

*p < .05. **p < .001.
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hypothesis. Subjects were, however, more likely to work with
Manager C (M = 2.39) than design the web page alone (M =
2.17), F(l, 149) = 5.513, p < .05. F-values and estimates of

the magnitude of each single-df comparison are presented in
Table 4. An additional analysis was conducted to determine

whether the respondents' gender was related to reported
likelihood of coalition formation. Each of the interactions
between the aforementioned contrasts and gender failed to

reach significance. Therefore, gender was not related to
reported likelihood of coalition formation.
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DISCUSSION

The results support Hypothesis 1, which states that
differences in the amount of information will lead to

differences in the desire to form coalitions. However, a
lack of support was found for Hypothesis 2. As stated

earlier, individuals were expected to be more likely to want
to form coalitions with those possessing cheating
information than with those possessing other types of
information. This was not the case. Results of the tests of

these hypotheses will be discussed in terms of prior
research. Practical implications of this research,
limitations, and directions for future research will also be

provided.

Results from three sets of analyses support Hypothesis

1. The first test revealed that individuals possessing a
great amount of information are more likely to work alone
(i.e., not form a coalition) than those with less

information. Evolutionary psychology suggests that
individuals will form coalitions to acquire resources that
were previously unattainable. Coalitions allow individuals
to achieve what cannot be achieved alone. Individuals are

more likely to form a coalition the more they have to gain
by doing so. Individuals already possessing large amounts of
resources have little to gain by forming a coalition,

relative to those possessing few resources. Therefore,
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forming a coalition is less necessary for those possessing
large amounts of resources.

Individuals with less information were more likely to
want to form a coalition with one who possessed a great

amount of information, a.s compared to those who already
possessed a great amount of information. This finding



supports an evolutionary perspective. Similar to other

models, evolutionary psychology maintains that forming

coalitions allows members to acquire resources that they
were previously denied as unallied individuals. The

propensity to form coalitions solved the adaptive problem of
resource accrual recurrently faced by our ancestors. Again,

individuals are more likely to form a coalition the more
they have to gain by doing so. It is not surprising that
those with fewer resources (less information) were more

likely to want to form a coalition with one who possessed
more resources (a great amount of information) than

individuals who already possessed a large amount of
resources.

It was expected that individuals with less information

would report a greater likelihood of wanting to form a
coalition with others, regardless of the amount of resources

they possessed, as compared to individuals with a great
amount of information. Although this was the case in

relation to the Department C manager, who possessed a great
amount of information (as discussed previously), this was

49.

not-the case with the Department B manager. Individuals
possessing less information did not differ from those

possessing a great amount of information regarding their
reported likelihood of wanting to form a coalition with the
Department B manager. This result was unexpected. We form
coalitions to achieve what cannot be achieved alone. For
example, those employees who are less skilled can

successfully complete tasks by allying themselves with more
skilled employees (rather than allying themselves with
other, less skilled employees). The relative reluctance of
individuals with less information to form a coalition with

one similarly situated is consistent with an evolutionary
perspective. In addition, the second test of Hypothesis 1

revealed that individuals with less information did report a
greater likelihood of wanting to form a coalition (across
managers) than those possessing a great amount of

information. This result supports the expectation that

individuals with less information would be more likely to
want to form a coalition than those with a great amount of
information.

Specifically, it was expected that individuals with
less information would report a greater likelihood of
forming a coalition (once a choice to form a coalition was

made) than those possessing a great amount of information.

Individuals with less information expressed a greater
likelihood of forming a coalition than those possessing a

■ -r':
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great amount of information, as revealed by the highest

value among the coalition-choice options for each

respondent. This finding demonstrates that, upon expressing
a desire to want to form a coalition, those with fewer

resources (less information) report a greater likelihood of

wanting to form a coalition than those possessing relatively
greater amounts of resources. Again, individuals are more

likely to form a coalition the' more they have to gain by
doing so. Our underprivileged ancestors who formed

coalitions were able to out-compete those who were similarly
situated and did not form coalitions. To summarize, the

finding that individuals with less information expressed a
greater likelihood of forming a coalition (once a choice to

form a coalition was made) than those possessing a great
amount of information provides additional support for
Hypothesis 1.

A third test of HypotheSiis''1 provides further support
and amplification. Individuals with less information

reported a greater likelihood of wanting to form a coalition

with managers C and D, who possessed great amoun.ts of

information, than forirl a coalition witH mahager B, who
possessed little information. As discussed previously,
coalition formation allows us to acquire resources that are
individually unattainable. Forming coa;litions allows
individuals to achieye what cannot be achieved alone.
Although coalition formation enabled bur a;ncestors to out
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compete those who did not form coalitions, it is reasonable

to suspect that it would have been more advantageous for our
underprivileged ancestors to foriri coalitions with those

possessing great amounts of resources, as opposed to those

who possessed few resources. Parallel findings were bbtained
for those participants possessing great amounts of

information. Individuals with a great amount of information
reported a greater likelihood of wanting to form a coalition

with manager C, who possessed a great amount of information^
than form a coalition with managers A or B, who possessed

little information. This finding was unexpected. It suggests
that, regardless of the amount of resources that we possess,
when we choose to form a coalition we choose to form with

those who possess a great amount of resources. The
"weakness-is-strength" effect (Miller & Komorita, 1986)

suggests that those with fewer resources are more likely to

be included in coalitions than those possessing greater
amounts of resources. In contrast, the present finding

demonstrates that those possessing greater amounts of
resources are more likely to be included in a coalition than

those with fewer resources,. It is reasonable to expect that
little benefit can be derived from forming a coalition with
one who possesses few resources. Those ancestors who formed

coalitions with individuals possessing great amounts of
resources probably fared better than those who formed

coalitions with individuals possessing few resources.

Additional research is needed to further explain this
finding..

Results from these three sets of analyses support
Hypothesis 1. Differences in the amount of information did
lead to differences in the desire 'td form cdalitions.

Consistent with an eyolutionary perspective/ those with
fewer resources were more likely to form coalitions than

those possessing greater amounts of resources. Furthermore,
when confronted with an environment of scarce resources,

those possessing few resources were more likely to form

coalitions than fend for themselves. These results not only
support ah evolutionary perspective, but also demonstrate

that information is an important organizational resource
that contributes to coalition formation. Again, these
results offer two important contributions: 1) the results

establish information as a resource involved in coalition

formation; and 2) the results address why individuals form
coalitions - to adapt to environments of limited resources.,

Practical implications of these findings will be provided
■ , ■.

later..

The results failed to siupport Hypothesis 2. Individuals
were not more likely to want to form coalitions with those 

possessing cheating information than with those possessing
other types of information. Instead, ' individuals were more

likely to want to form a coalition with Manager A, who

possessed graphic design Information, or Manager B, who
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possessed customer relations information, than form a

coalition with Manager C, who possessed cheating

information. They were, however, more likely to form a
coalition with Manager C than work alone. Several

explanations may account for this finding.

Cosmides and Tooby (1992) provide empirical support for
a psychological mechanism capable of detecting cheaters in
social exchange situations. If humans possess the innate
capability to detect cheaters, it is reasonable to assume

that we have little need to seek information regarding
cheaters from other, secondary sources. That is, since we

can detect cheaters ourselves, we presumably will not need
to seek this information from others.

Furthermore, the psychological mechanism capable of

detecting cheaters can only be activated by particular
contextual input, such as the nonreciprocation of others

(Cosmides & Tooby, 1992). Similar to other psychological
mechanisms, the ability to detect cheaters is context-

dependent. The present study did not provide an adequate
context for the activation of this psychological mechanism.

The organizational scenarios succeeded in providing a
context only for the activation of the psychological
mechanism enabling coalition formation. A critical element

of the Cosmides and Tooby (1992) study was the violation of

social contracts, as evidenced by the nonreciprocation of
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others. There was no indication of nonreciprocation in the
scenario.

Another explanation that may account for the failure to

support Hypothesis 2 concerns a methodological

consideration. The content of Organizational Scenario B may
have confounded the results. Participants may have viewed

information regarding graphic design as more relevant to the

task of designing a new company, web page than cheating

information. Therefore, participants expressed a greater
likelihood of wanting to form a coalition with Manager A,
who possessed graphic design information, than Manager C,
who possessed cheating information. Indeed, the scenario
states, "In fact. Manager A has improved the artistic

quality of past projects." Similarly, participants may have
viewed customer relations information as extremely relevant
to the task of designing a new web page to attract new
customers. The scenario states, "Manager B has an

understanding of customer needs." Participants likely viewed
this information as more task-relevant (and, therefore, more

important) than cheating information. It is not surprising
that participants expressed a greater likelihood of wanting
to form a coalition with Manager B, who possessed customer

relations information, than Manager C, who possessed

cheating information. Participants only reported a greater
likelihood of forming a coalition with Manager C in relation
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to designing the web page alone. This interpretation
provides indirect support for Hypothesis 1.

Again, the first hypothesis suggests that individuals
will want to form coalitions with those possessing resources
that may be viewed as critical to success. Tests of

Hypothesis 2 revealed that participants reported a greater
likelihood of wanting to form coalitions with those

possessing resources that may have been viewed as more
critical to success (graphic design and customer relations
information), compared to those possessing resources that

may have been:viewed as less critical for success (cheating
information). In short, individuals may to want to form
coalitions with those possessing resources that are viewed
as critical to successfully completing a particular task.
These arrangements are expected to be the most fruitful.

To summarize, the results failed to support Hypothesis
2. Two explanations addressing theoretical Concerns were

provided, as well as a methodological consideration.: As
stated earlier, we pbssess many complex and specific

psychological mechanisms that Can be deployed individually
and in complex combinations depending on circumstances

(Buss, 1995). Attempting to demonstrate the interaction of
two psychological mechanisms (one that enables coalition .

formation and another that is responsible for detecting
cheaters) is a complex: endeavor, strewn with theoretical and
methodological pitfalls. The majority of prior research has
■
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focused on the identification and explanation of a single
psychological mechanism, as well as the context in which

that mechanism may be activated. This research has
collectively provided a greater understanding of the human
mind. Evolutionary psychology is best characterized as a
series of tight theoretical articulations subsumed under the

rubric of evolutionary theory. The hallmark of evolutionary
psychology is parsimony. Therefore, future endeavors should
strive to maintain this standard and conduct research that

is theory-driven. To this end,'the importance of
evolutionary psychology for other areas, such as

organizations, will be fully realized. The results of the
current study provide practical implications for
organizations.

'

Organizations present an environment of limited
resources.- The hierarchical arrangement of positions in

organizations and the prevalence of social networks (e.g.,
the informal grapevine) implies that the more highly placed

or well-conhected employees will have access to resources
denied to entry-level or isolated employees. This creates/a

situation of inequality in resource distribution. Resources

are a determinant of organizational behavior. The present
study demonstrates that one outcome of resource inequality

is the formation of coalitions. When provided an opportunity
to work alone or form a coalition with another employee,
individuals were more likely to want to form a coalition
■ ,57 ,

with one who possessed a great amount of resources than one

possessing few resources. The context provided to

participants was characterized by task and resource
interdependence. It is reaspnable to assume that few
organizations are characterized by environments of resource
abundance or little task interdependence. Therefore, ■

coalition formation appears to be a staple of organizational

life. Organizations,must consider the' political advantages
and disadvantages of the formation of groups not formally .
sanctioned by the organization when providing access to
limited resources.

There were several limitations to this study. The use
of self-report measures has often been criticized. The

present study is hot exempt from this criticism. Of

particular concern is the accuracy with which participants
completed the surveys.

A statement was included among the directions for

completing the surveys to enhance the involvement of the'

participants. Subjects were informed that they would be

using the information provided in the scenarios during a
simulated business exercise. It was expected that the
statement would increase the participants' care and
attention. Although the manipulation checks for each

scenario demonstrated that participants received the
information as intended, it is impossible to assess the
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accuracy with which subjects responded to the coalition
questions.

■ Another limitation concerns student-sainpling
procedures. Data was coriected from several sections of
undergraduate psychology courses. The majority of the

students were Caucasian:females 18 to 25 years Of age. The
relative homogeneity of this Sample not only challenges the
representativeness of the participants' responses, but also

limits the generaliz'ability of the findings.
A similar limitation is the scenario-based approach.

Participants were ashed to assume they were managers working
in a particular organization. Obviously, this approach is
less ecolbgiCally valid than collecting data from a sample
of managers actually confronted with the situations
described in each scenario. AS stated earlier, this
scenario-based approach was undertaken because it is more
feasible than a field study.

Finally, organizations present a much more complex

environment than is capable of being adequately described in

a scenario. For example, the information to which people
have access in organizational contexts is often ambiguous.

Constraints on communication among organizational members
can further restrict the availability of information (Miller

& Komorita, 1986). Thus, employees are likely to form
coalitions with those they can communicate with directly,
rather than with others with whom they can communicate only
59,.
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indirectly. The present study did not address these dynamic
qualities of organizations.

Future research would benefit from a field design. This

design would address iimitations regarding the use of selfreport measures, student sampling procedures, and scenario-

based approaches. A field study of coalition formation would
also address many dynamic qualities of organizations that

are typically neglected in suryey tesearch.
In addition, research is needed to further demonstrate

the.utility of examining organizational behavior from an

adaptive perspective. As stated earlier, the evolutionary
perspective in applied psychology addresses "why" and

"function" questions, while the traditional perspective is
concerned with "what" and "how" questions (eolarelli, 1998).
The organizational literature has provided a wealth of

research demonstrating coalition formation. The present
study not only demonstrates coalition formation, it offers a

powerful explanatory framework for this phenomenon.

Specifically, this research suggests that coalition
formation seryes ah •imporbant adaptive function - resource

accrual. Although this approach is rare amdn^ organizational
scientists (Golarelli, 1998), the present Study demonstrates
that applied psychologists would benefit from an adaptive
perspective.

For example,- the valence-instrumentality-expectancy
(VIE) theory of work motivation assumes that our behavior
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results from choices among alternatives, and that "these

choices (behaviors) are systematically related to

psychological processes, particularly perception and the ~

formation of beliefs

(Pinder, 1996, p.69) The expectancy

component of VIE theory assumes that people believe that if

they put forth effort, the effort will lead to performance.

The instrumentality component suggests that this performance
will lead to a particular outcome. Valence is the value

people ascribe to outcomes. VIE theory presents a hedonistic
view. That is, individuals are motivated to maximize

pleasure and avoid pain. Therefore, VIE theory predicts that
people will attempt to maximize their outcomes.

An adaptive perspective can focus on the evolutionary

significance of this behavior. An understanding of why
individuals seek to maximize their outcomes may facilitate
practical applications of VIE theory. In addition to work

motivation, an adaptive perspective may inform
organizational development.

Organizations have historically overlooked employee

resistance to large-scale change. Employees react negatively
to disruptions in the workplacei

of large-scale

changes experience a lowered sense of morale and

organizatiorial/Commitment. Consequently, the overall
productivity of the organization decreases.
Evolutionary psychology can address the inherent

difficulties of adapting to a changing environment. This

■ ■ r..-'
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approach can also address the consequences of employees'

inability to adapt to organizational changes. An
understanding of why employees are resistant to large-scale

change may help organizations and employees adapt to changes
more successfully.

Finally, increased interest in team building suggests
the need to examine the adaptive functioning of team-

building strategies within organizations. In particular,
self-managed teams represent an innovative approach within
organizational development. These teams are autonomous and

adaptive to organizational change. An evolutionary

perspective can examine the adaptive nature of self-managed
teams.

To summarize, an evolutionary perspective holds an'

important place in organizational theory (Colarelli, 1998).
The application of evolutionary psychology to organizational
contexts is a new area of research. It is hoped that the
present study will serve as an impetus for future

applications of an adaptive perspective to organizational
behavior.

The present study establishes the importance of

information as a resource contributing to coalition
formation. This research responds to Miller and Komorita
(1986), who state "very little is known about the effects of
information and communication restrictions on coalition

behavior."(p.126) They also state that few studies of.
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coalition formation "have systematically manipulated
information and communication yariables:"(p.125) The
majority of research regarding coalition formation within

organizations includes resources such as votes or money.
More research examining the impact of information on

coalition formation-is sorely needed.

This research provides an empirical test of an
evolutionary perspective of coalition formation. This area

is at an initial stage of development and, therefore,
demands further testing. Future study would provide a
greater understanding of the nature of the psychological
mechanism contributing to-coalition formation, as .well as

further articulating the forms of contextual input that
activate the operation of this mechanism.

In conclusion, the present study contributes to the

areas of evolutionary psychology, social psychology/ and
industrial/ofganizational (I/O) psychology. This research

demonstrates the importance of evolutionary psychology for
organizations in understanding organizational behavior.

Evolutionary psychology provides an explanatory framework
powerful enough to interpret behavior in a complex

environment sUch as the organization. Applied psychologists
would greatly benefit from invoking an adaptive perspective

to understand the infinite number of diverse problems posed
by organizations.

^
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APPENDIX

Organizational Behavior Survey

Directions:

On the following pages are two organizational scenarios. Please read each
scenario carefully and respond to the accompanying questions.In the last
phase of this study, you will be participating in a simulated business exercise.
You will be using the information provided in the following scenarios while
participating in this exercise. Keep in mind that there are no right or wrong
answers. Circle only one response for each question. It is important to try to
respond to every statement.
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Organizational Scenario A

Assume you are a manager in Xanadu,Inc. Xanadu has recently experienced
dramatic reductions in customers. The company web page has successfully attracted many
new customers in the past. However,Xmiadu's web page has not been updated for seyeral

years; Therefore,the president of Xanadu has asked four department managers to provide
designs for a new company web page. The department or departments(if managers

choose to work together)providing the best design will receive an increase in important
resources(like more money and more staff positions).If managers work together and
provide the best design,they will have to divide the resources among themselves. The

department managers selected to participate in the design of a new company web page are
A,B,C,and D.You are the manager of Department A.

As the manager of Department A,you lack technological information. You have

only been an employee of Xanadu for three months,and you are not yet completely
familiar with your position. The manager of Department B possesses a similar amount of
technological information.

In contrast,the managers of departments C and D possess a tremendous amount of

technological information.In fact,these managers have been employees of Xanadu for
over three years, and are very familiar with their positions.

Please respond to questiohs 1-4 according to a 5-point scale:

'' ■ ■ ■ ■ ;
No information

r' ' :3./y
Little
information

4

Moderate amount

Much

of

information

information
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,5
Great amount
of
information

1. How much technological information does the Department A Manager possess?
' ■

1 ,2 3 4 ,5

2. How much technological information does the Department B Manager possess?^
1

2

3

4

5

3.How much technological information does the Department C Manager possess?
1

2

3

4

5

4.How much technological information does the Department D Manager possess?
1

2

3

4

5

5.The following questions list actions you could take as the manager ofDepartment A to
design the new company web page.

Please rate the following actions according to a 5-point scale:
1

2

Will not do

>

3

Not very likely

4

Somewhat likely

Very likely

How likely are you to...

a)work with the Department B manager to design the new web page?
1

2

3

4

5

4

5

b)design the new company web page by yourself?
1

2

3

c)work with the Department C manager to design the new web page?

■ 1
'2 ■ '3 ■ ;4 , ;5
d)work with the Department D manager to design the new web page?
1

2

3
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4

5

5
Will do

Organizational Scenario B

Assume you are a manager in Utopia,Inc. Utopia has recently experienced

dramatic reductions in customers.The company web page has successfully attracted many
new customers in the past. However,Utopia's web page has not been updated for several

years. Therefore,the president ofUtopia has asked four department managers to provide
designs for a new company web page. The department or departments(if managers
choose to work together)providing the best design will receive an increase in important
resources(like more money and more staff positions). If managers work together and
provide the best design,they will have to divide the resources among themselves. The

department managers selected to participate in the design of a new company web page are
A,B,C,and D. You are the manager of Department D.
Manager A possesses information about graphic design. In fact. Manager A has

improved the artistic quality ofpast projects. Manager B possesses customer relations
information. Manager B has an understanding ofcustomer needs. Manager C possesses
information about which managers at Utopia are likely to use trickery(e.g. stealing other

managers' ideas)to compete for scarce resources. You are Manager D. As Manager D,
you possess information regarding only your department and generaljob duties.

6. Which manager possesses information regarding graphic design?
A

B

C

D

7. Which manager possesses information about the ways that other managers might cheat?

A

B

C

D

8. Which manager possesses information regarding only their ownjob duties?
A

B

C

D

9. Which manager possesses customer relations information?
A

B
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C

D

10. The following questions list actions you could take as the manager ofDepartment D
to design the new company web page.

Please rate the following actions according to a 5-point scale:

1

2

Will not do

>

Not very likely

3

4

Somewhatlikely

5

Very likely

Will do

How likely are you to...

a) work with manager A,as opposed toBorC?

1

2

3

4

5

b)design the new company web page by yourself? 1

2

3

4

5

c)work with manager C,as opposed to A or B?

1

2

3

4

5

d)work with manager B,as opposed to A or C?

1

2

3

4

5
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